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COMMENTS
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF - INCRIMINATION

PROTECT

AN

ACCUSED

FROM PHYSICAL DISCLOSURES?
The'Federal Government and forty-six states have. incorpbrated within
their cohstitutions the common law privilege against self-incrimination. Iowa'
and New Jersey,2 the twd exceptions, have accepted the privilege.either by incorporation into their common law by judicial interpretation or. by statute.
Originally, this univefsal -acceptance was an outgrowth of the thumb-screw
and rack 'days of the star chamber "ih; England, and the protection from
physical torture by officers of the -la-w..to- extract confessions was deemed
such a *fundamental right' as to warrant:-constitutional safeguards., However,
since its adoption in this countty,' authorities both in and outside of 'the legal
field have questioned the "purpose and-policy of retaining the privilege in any
form.4 Regardless of the merits of retaining or abolishing the privilege, as a
practical" matter the courts are continually faced with the problem of its
scope in view of'its historical origin and present day needs; It is the purpose
of thi cdmment to reflect the attitude of the various jurisdictions to the invocation of the privilege by an accused to exclude incriminating evidence obtained by compulsibn relating to -physical disclosures such as - fingerprints,
footprints and physical and mental examinations, as distinguished from "testimonial utterances." 6
SCOPE

Although all jurisdictions concede that the pri-ilege protects an accused
from compelled "testimonial utterances," there is a pronounced di'ergence of
opinion as to whether historically or presently it extends to the fur-ishing
of evidence by means other than by word of mouth, i.e. as 1y r~moving or
1. See State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N. W. 935 (1902) where the court construed

the "due process" clause as including the privilege against self-incrimination. Also see
McGovney, Self-Criminating and Self-Disgracing Testimfony Code Revision Bill, 5 IoWVA
L. BULL. 174 (1920).
2. See State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N. J. L. 619, 55 At. 743 (1903).; Comnp. STAT. 1910,
EVIDENCE § 8, Rav. STAT. 1937, § 2:97-6, 7.
3. For the historical development of the privilege against self-incrimination, see 8
WiGa.toRE, EvIDENCE § 2250 (3d ed. 1940); Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional
History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination it Ainerica, 21 Va. L. Rev. 763
(19345.)e BMNTAm, RIAJONALE OF JuDIClAL E6'DExCE, bk. 9, pt. 1, c. 3 (Brownings ed.,
vol. VII, p. 449 et seq.) ; 8 WIG-MORE, EVIDECcE § 2251 (3d ed. 1940). 5. Compulsory "testimonial utterances" are words, oral or written, extracted from a
person as a witness by the use of legal process.
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replacing garments and shoes worn by the accused and using them against
him.
In Holt v. United States 6 the accused was compelled to put on a blouse
and the testimony of a witness that it fitted him was held to be admissible.
Mr. Justice IHotne's, speaking for the majority, declared, "... the prohibition
of cmmipelling a: man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a
prohibition of the tise of physical or moral compulsion! to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material." I Tie opposing view is set forth by Mr. Chief Justice Belt in his
strong dissent in State v. Cram 8 decrying the further limitation of the privilege by the rhajorityin holding that a compulsory blood test was admissible.
"Other courts give a broader and more liberal interpretation to the Consti"tution and do not limit the privilege of immunity to the giving of oral testimony, but hold that it embraces as well the firnishing of other evidence, by
the accused, which might aid in establishing his guilt. 9
Although'-the majority of jurisdictions limit the privilege to testimonial
compulsion, there aie some jutisdictions which, through fear of an unlimited
invasion bf- an individual's person, adhere to the broad and liberal :application. In the former, the outstanding:-problem consists of defining the scope
of "testimonial" compulsion. In the latter the problem becomes more complex since in- order to preent undue protection of criminals without endangering the inhocent, the courts have been Iobliged to place illogical limitations
uipon their own rule:-Thes di-ergent views are more clearly illustrated by applying: them to
different factu'al situations and by observing the results.
FINGERPRINTS AND

PHOTOGRAPHS

Usually a person under arrest submits voluntarily to fingerprinting and
photographing. 0 Once it is established to have been voluntary, the accused
cannot assert that the privilege against self-incrimination has been violated,
since he is deemed to have waived it," even though he had no knowledge
that they would be used against him.'"
6. 218 U. S. 245 (1910).
7. Id. at 252,253. Wigmore supp6rts this view when he says,
i...
t is not merely
,apy and, every coinjulsion that is the krfiahl of the privilege, in history afid in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion." 8 WIGMO&R, EVDENcF § 2263 (3d ed.
-1940).
8: 160 P. 2d 283 (1945).
9. Id. at 293. Jones supports this view. 3

11926).

JONEg, EvIDECCE

§ 1391, p. 2537 (2d ed.

..

I0., Fingeirrinting and photographing are treated together, as the same principles
are involved.
1 11. Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418, 198 Pac. 288 (1921) ; Rand v. Ladd, 26 N. W. 2d
107 (Iowa 1947) ; State v. Watson, 49 A. 2d 174 (Vt. 1946) ; State v. Johnson,,111 W.
Va. 227, 164 S. E. 31 (1932), The court implied that even if fingerprints were obtalntiM
compulsorily, admissible.
12. Garcia v. State, 26 Ariz. 597, 229 Pac. 103 (1924).
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Almost all juri§4ic Qn -permit the introduction as evidence. of fingerprints, -photogpaphsoQi: measurements .taken. under compulsion, 3 and. many.,
curts without.a precedent have cited su.ch cases as support for a h9lding that.
other physical evidence, obtained under compulsion -is admissible. In the lead.
ing case ofQPeoplev. .Sallow,' 4 the New York court in: sustaining t 3 e right
of authorities to take .fingerprints over.the objectio .. of. the defendant,
reasoned, "By the requirement that the defendant's fingerprints be taken
there is no danger that the defendant will be required to give false testimony.
The witness does not testify. The physical facts speak for themselves; no
fears, no hopes, no will: bf- the prisoner to falsify or exaggefate could produce or credta a resemblance of her- fingerprints or change thefin one lin'e
and-therefore: there is no danger of error being committed or lintfuth told.'1J15
So also the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 16 in permitting'
an a~cused to be finge'printed before arraignment under threat of force, Oven
with Jiifdt Augustus Hand speakifg for
in the absence of a statute,
-said,

the court, -'Any re~traint of the pers6n-miay be butdei'some. flut 96me burThe slight interdens mbst be borne- foi the g6od of the- community .
ference with the person involved in fingerprinfing -seems to us one which
must be borhd-in the common interest." 17"
An 6pposing 'stand 'was taken in People 'v. Hevern,;' in whicli'casi a:
stdtute impliedly c6mfihrnding persons arrested -fbr certain' offenses to be
fingerprinted' Was held violative of' the privilege. "Concededly there*mray not
be a compulsory written&xamindtion' of a defendafit as 'to his pastcareer, and
in my judgment he may not be compelled to make ldiscogure of his past life
•
,
by the nod-or nay of the head or the liiies of his hands.' 19.
13. Shannon v. State, 207 Ark., 658, 182 S. W. 24 384 (1944). ,The court held -that
authorities could force a ,defendant .released - on bail,, to return for -the purpose of,
fingerprinting. Mabry- .' Kettering, 92 Ark. 81,. 122 S.. .W.- 11.5. (1909)I State e'rel.'
Bruns v. Clausmier, 144 nd. 599, 57 N. E. 541. (1900); Downs v. Swann,111 Md. t, 73
Atl. 653 (1909) ; Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107N. J. Eq.141, 152 Ati. 17 (1930) (modifying
State v. -Cerciello, 86 N. J. L. 309, 90 AtI. 1112, (1914) ; U. S. v. Cross, 20 D C. 365.
(1892), afftd, ,145 U.. S. 571 (-1892) (Prisoner's measurement taken and introduced in
evidence against him).;-Sbaffer v. U. S. 24 D. C. Api. 417 (1904) (Photographs admissible unless excessive force has been employed); Conners v. State, 134 Tex. Cr.
App. 278, 115 S. W. 2d 681 (1938); McGarry v. State, 8Z Tex. Cr. R. 597, 200 S. W. 527
(1918).

-

-

I

14. 100 Misc. Rep. 447, 165 N. Y. Supp. 915 (N. Y. Cty. Ct. 1917).
II
15. Id. at,924.
.
16. United States v. Kelley, 55 F. 2d 67 (C. C. A. 2d 1932).
17. Id. at 68. The "public interest" angle was also employed in Bartletta v. -McFeeley,
107 N. J. Eq. 141, 152 Atl. 17, 18 (1930) where the court supports right of police to take
compulsory fingerprints and photographs, "by the argument from convenience and from
the public interest in permitting the courts to learn the truth of the question at issue."
18. 127 Mis. Rep. 141, 215 N. Y. Supp. 412 (1926).
19. Id. at 419. Although the Sallow Case, supra note 14, was decided by the New
York court nine years previously, no mention of it is made. In this connection, note that
in People v. Dennis, 131- Misc. 62, 226 N. Y. Supp. 689. (1928), People v. Hevern, supra
note 18, was cited as authority for holding that a compulsory physical examination to
determine intoxication, violates the privilege, while People v. Sallow, supra note 14 again
was not cited. Accord, De Mello v. Gabrielson, 34 Hawaii 459 (1937) where, in an action
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Most states have enacted legislation controlling fingerprinting or "photographing. One type makes it inandatory for authorities to take the fingerprints of certain classes of arrested persons with the limitation that they be
returned upon acquittal.20 Another type authorizes officers to take fingerprints
or photographs with limitations. 21 And still another type merely provides for
22
the taking of fingerprints of criminals after conviction.
FOOTPRINTS

Today, regardless of the attitude taken by the courts as to the scope of
the rule against self-incrimination, almost all jurisdictions permit the introduction of incriminating evidence obtained by the use of shoes forcibly
taken from the accused after arrest. Though the courts in upholding the admission of such evidence have gone into elaborate discussions as to whether
it violates the privilege,23 it is submitted that the better and simpler foundation
for admitting the evidence is the real evidence rule-the permission granted
to officers to take from the accused after arrest such things on his person as
24
may reveal the commission of the crime.
But, when the courts do consider the scope of the privilege under these
fact situations, it seems that they more readily accept the proposition that

it extends only to testimonial compulsion. "Such evidence is not considered
as making a person furnish evidence against himself. It is dependent upon
physical facts and conditions and does not depend upon confessions, admissions or statements of the prisoner." 25 Once the court indorses this definition,
the question remains, is such a restricted construction justified today? The
for unlawful imprisonment, the compulsory taking of fingerprints and photographs of the
plaintiff when not under arrest was held to be unconstitutional.
20. IOWA CODE c. 749.2 (1946); KANSAS STAT. C. 178 § 1 (1931).
21. S. D. COj)E § 55.1606, 55.1607 (1939); Miss. CODE § 2610 (1942).
22. TEX. STAT. C. 181 § 14 (1935).
23. Myers v. State, 97 Ga. 76, 25 S. E. 252 (1895); Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200,
167 N. E. 129 (1929) ; State -v. Jeffries, 210 Mo. 302, 109 S. W. 614 (1908) ; State v.
Allen, 156 Kan. 717, 137 P. 2d 163 (1943); State v. Graham, 116 La. 779, 41 So. 90
(1906) ; People v. Breen, 192 Mich. 39, 158 N. W. 142 (1916) ; Younger v. State, 80 Neb.
201, 114 N. W. 170 (1907) ; State v. Barela, 23 N. M. 395, 168 Pac. 545 (1917) ; People
v. Van Wormer, 175 N. Y. 188, 67 N. E. 299 (1903) ; State v. Ragland, 227 N. C. 162,
41 S. E. 2d 285 (1947) ; Gore v. State, 25 Okla. Cr. 214, 219 Pac. 153 (1923) ; State v.
Griffin, 129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81 (1924) ; Chase v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. 349, 261 S. W.
574 (1924) ; State v. Nordstrom, 7 Wash. 506, 35 Pac. 382 (1893). See Lee v. State, 27
Ariz. 52, 229 P ac. 939 (1924). Though upon the facts the court found shoes were voluntarily surrendered-eit implies that evidence would be admissible if forcibly taken, State v.
Fuller, 34 Mont. 12, 85 Pac. 369 (1906). Shoes voluntarily given, but court restricted use
of privilege to "testimonial utterances."
24. Cody v. State, 167 Miss. 150, 148 So. 627 (1933) (only reason assigned) ; State
v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646 (1876) (partial reason); State v. Nordstrom, 7 Wash. 506, 35
Pac. 382 (1893) (partial reason). Some states permit the introduction of such evidence
although obtained by officers through illegal search and'seizuie, But in states which preclude introduction of illegally obtained evidence, not only is the privilege question involved
but also whether taking of shoes constitutes an illegal search and seizure.
25. State v. Thompson, 161 N. C. 238, 76 S. t. 249, 250 (1912).
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Oklahoma court in Gore v. State 26 declared, "The prohibition was not designed to protect those guilty of crime or to hamper or prevent the detection
of crime, where the means employed have no tendency to fashion guilt upon
innocent persons.2 7 Here the act of giving up the shoe, by compulsion, has
no direct tendency to implicate, others who might be innocent or to force a.
confession.
To date only one state has not reversed its prior decisions in excluding
this evidence by refusing to apply either the real evidence rule or the restrictive use of the privilege. In Davis v. State28 the testimony of a witness that
the accused had refused to take off his shoes for the purpose of comparison
with tracks was held inadmissible because it violated the privilege. ". . . to
conserve the spirit and purpose of the guaranty the accused cannot, directly
or indirectly, be compelled to do an affirmative act, or to affirmatively sayanything which may tend to criminate him." 29
Generally, no distinction is made between the admissibility of evidence
obtained by forcibly taking the shoes from the defendent and the admissibility
of evidence 6btained by compelling the'defendant to make footprints, upon
the rationale that in the latter case the accused does nothing with Is shoes
that could i :have been done as well by others after the shoes have been
30
taken from him.
But in State v. Griffin,31 where both sets of facts were-placed before
the court, the evidence relating to the forcible taking of the shoes from the
accused was admitted on the basis that the officer, distinct from-what the accused said or did, performed the act; but the evidence obtained from forcing,
the defendant to place his foot in a track was excluded on the ground that
the fact appeared from the forced cbnduct of the accused--clearly testimonial
compulsion. 32 If in truth, the modern basis in invoking the privilege is to
26. 25 Okla. Cr. 214, 219 Pac. 153 (1923).

2.7.
Id. at 155.

28. 131 AIa. 10, 31 So. 569 (1902).
29. Id. at-571. Accord,'-Anthony v. State, 7 So. 2d 513 (Ala. 1942). Compare Hicks:
v. State, 247 Ala. 439, 25 So. 2d 139 (1946) and Clark v. State, 240'Ala. -65, 197 So. 23T.
(1940), where the Alabama court in both instances admitted testimony of a state's witness as to the comparison of shoes taken from defendant's home and admitted by defendant
to be his own with tracks found at the scene -of crime, with no consideration of theDavis case, 131 Ala. 10, 31 So. 569 (1902) or the Anthony case, supra. It would seem,
that no distinction should be made between taking shoes from the defendant's person and,
his home.
30. State v. Graham, 116 La- 779, 41 So. 90 (1906); State v. Prudhomme, 25 La..
Ann. 522 (1873); Johnson v. State, 55 Fla. 46, 46 So. 154 (1908); Magee v. State,.
98 Miss. 865, 46 So. 529, 532 (1908), "He is not, in such cases, giving evidence. He is not
testifying as a witness. He is not delivering any testimonial utterance." Cf. State v.
Barela, 23 N. M. 395, 168 Pac. 545 (1917) where court held that defendant could be
compelled before arrest to make tracks, but inferred that privilege might be violated if
compulsion followed arrest or was granted by court sanction.
31. 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81 (1924). Decision- contained dicta to effect that defendant could not be forced over his objection to put shoe on in court, though he coul&
be forced in court to measure the shoe.
32. It is doubtful that the latter would come within the definition of testimonial compulsion. See note -5supra.
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force prosecuting officers to go out, search and obtain all extrinsic evidence
tending to show that the defendant committed the offense, or to exclude evidence of doubtful veracity, a consequence of intimidation, does a logical distinction exist between forcibly taking shoes from the accused and forcing
him to make footprints? According to State v. Graham,33 the leading case in
this field, the answer is no, for, as the court in effect stated, since confessions
are excluded because.they cannot be relied upon as guides to the truth, due
to fears and hopes, "No fears or hopes of the prisoner could produce the resemblance of his track to that found in the corn field." 34 A few states reject
such evidence outright as forcing a man to give evidence against himself.85
STANDING Up IN COURT
Courts are in almost complete accord in holding that an accused can be
required to stand up in court for purposes of identification by a witness or by
the jury, assigning one or more of the following reasons:36
1. It does not violate the privilege, since the accused is not performing an
act which associates him with the l~erpetration of a crime.
2. Standiiig up in court is not within the scope of testimonial compulsion,
since it does not involve oral or written utterances.
3. Since the defendant must appear at his trial, his physical features are
with him and recognition of those features is not incriminating.
4. The court has inherent power to seat the accused in any direction or
in any maier during the trial.
A few stat.s have held otherwise. 37 However, recent cases in these states
cast a doubt upon the present status of the rule in those states. 38
33. 74 N. C. 646 (1876).

34. Id. at 647.
35. Cooper v. State, 86 Ala. 610, 6 So. 110 (1889)

(Witness could not testify that

the accused had refused to make tracks) ; Daugherty v. State, 28 Ala. App. 453, 186 So.
780 (1939) ; Day v. State, 63 Ga. 668 (1879) ; Elder v. State, 143 Ga. 363, 85 S. E. 97
(1915); State v. Atkinson, 40 S. C. 363, 18 S. E. 1021 (1894); See Stokes v. State,
5 Baxt. 619 (Ten,- 1875).
36. People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328, 19 Pac. 161 (1888) ; People v. Oliviera, 127 Cal.
376, 59 Pac. 772 (1899) (Accused required to stand to determine his size) ; Appelby v.
State, 221 Ind. 544, 48 N. E. 2d 646 (1943) ; People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 38.N. E.
1003 (1894); State v. Vincent, 222 N. C. 543, 23 S. E. 2d 832 (1943) ; Commonwealth
v. San Juan, 129 Pa. Super. 179, 195 Atl. 433 (1937) ; Commonwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa.
Super. 333, 186 At. 177 (1936) ; State v. DeCesare, 68 R. I. 32, 26 A. 2d 237 (1942) ;
State v. O'Neal, 42 S. E. 2d 523 (S. C. 1947) ; Funderburgh v. State, 144 Tex. Cr. App.
,?5, 160 S. W. 2d 942 (1942); State v. Clark, 156 Wash. 543, 287 Pac. 18 (1930);
State v.:Fulks, 114 W. Va. 785, 173 S. C. 888 (1934); Swingle v. United States, 151
F. 2d 512 (1945).
.
37. Smith v. State, 247 Ala. 354, 24 So. 2d 546 (1946) ; Wells -,. State, 20 Ala, App.
240, 101 So. 624 (1924) ; see Williams v. State, 98 Ala. 52, 13 So. 333 (1893); People v.
Greenberg, 73 Cal. App. 2d 675, 167 P. 2d 214 (1946) (Court did not base decision on
rule)-; Blackwell v. State, 67 Ga. 76, 79 (1881). Court held that defendant could not be
required'to stand on ground, "A defendant cannot be compelled to criminate hi'mself by
acts or words."
38. Compare Orr v. State, 236 Ala. 462, 183 So. 445 (1938) where court held that
compelling accused to put on a coat or hat found in his possession at time of arrest, for
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AcTs 'ASSOCIATING THE ACCUSED WITH CRIATE

Suppose'the defendant, accused of committing a crime, is required by
the court or by officers to put on a coat or a hat, or to reveal marks or scars
on his body. Would the privilege against self-incrimination be a valid defense
against the inclusion of evidnce so obtained? Logic, without infrifhging upon
the spirt rpurpose of the privilege, seeis to require a negative answer even
though"a'n act is required'on the part of tfie 'accused. 'Thus, forcing the accused to put on.or to remove clothing in orout of court for purposes of identification, 9 'to reveal marks, scars or wounds, 40 to place a handkerchief over
his face so as to simullate the criminal, 41 to shave and to trim his hair so as to
prevent a false appearance of insanity and to aid identification, 4 2 to remove
a bandage fr6m his hand to see if in !act a wound was &videncel,4

to expose

his body to an examination to determine the presence of blood, 4 4 ok to scrape
blood from under his fingernails, 45 have been held not violative of the privilege.
Actually, the decisions contrary to'this view are negligible, for one such
decisiof146 in effect has been overruled, 4 7 and the exclusion in another was not
48
based upon the privilege.
49
'In All1n v. State, a recent Maryland case,
the court flatly held tlat the
defendant could not be 'compelied to try on a hat, since an affimiative act or
experimentation by the accused in. open court which might aid in establishing
purpose of identification, did niot viol'ate the privilege, with Alabama cases, supra note 37.
Comparc People v. Greenberg, sqpra note 37, with People v. Goldenson, supra note 36.
Also, compare Blackwell v. State, supra note 37, with Meriwhether v. State, 63 Ga. App.
667, -11 S. E: 2d 816 (1940)., -n Ltter case, the Zourt, in holding that a defendant could
be compelled .to .stand in a.,police line up :for purpose of identification, distinguished
Blackwell case, on giound defendant Was not being compplled to do an overt act in
process of identification, but merely to stand passively.
39. Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (1910) ; Orr v. State, 236 Ala. 462, 183 So.
445 (1938) ; Pebple'v. Clark, 18 Cal. 2d 449, 116 P. 2d 56 (1941) ; People v. Cammarata,
257 Mich. 60, 240 N. V. 14 (1932) ; Henrietta Robinson's Trial, 11 Amer. St. Tr. 529
(N. Y. 1854); State v. Rutherford, 104 W. Va. 427, 140 S. E. 147' (1927) ; 'see State v.
Aspara, 113 La. 940, 37 So. 883 (1904).
40. O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 N. E. 137 (1890) ; State v. Tettaton, 159 Mo.
354, 60 5.,W.. 743 (1900) ; State of Nevada v. Au Chuey, 14 Nev. 79 (1879) ; State v.
Miller,"71 N. J.*L. 527, 60 Atl. 202 (1905).
41. Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 182 N. E. 865 (1932).
42. People v. Strauss, 174 Misc. 881, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 155 (1940).
43. 'State v. Anica Garrett and Lucy Stanley, 71 N. C. 85 (1874).
44. McFarland v. United States, 150 F. 2d 593 (1945).
45. State v. McLaughlin, 138 La.'958, 70 So. 925 (1916).
46.-State v. Jacobs, 50 N. C. 259 (1858).. The court held that the defendant could not
be required to stand so that the jury might see whether he was of a certain degree of color.
47. In State v. Vincent, 222 N. C. 543, 23 S. E. 2d 832 (1943), the court distinguished
standing in court for identification from compelling the negro to stand by saying that
the issue was the identity'of 'the acused and not the status or degree of color. Obviously,
both are the same.
48. Turman v. 'State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 7, 95 S. W. 533 (1906) (Court based decision
on ground 'that the defendant cannot be compelled to undergo an experiment before the
jury) : Conipare Benson v. State, 69 S. W. 165 (Tex. 1902) ; Bruce v. State, 31 Tex.
Cr. R. 590, 21 S. W. 681 (1893).
49. 183 Md. 603, 39 A. 2d 820 (1944).
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his guilt violated the privilege. But the same court in Shank.s v. State 00 permitted a state's witness to testify that blood taken from the accused's coat over
his objection was of a certain type, on the ground the evidence was obtained
by comparisons or experiments conducted outside of court by persons other
than the accused and was presented in court through the lips of others than
the accused. In view of this case, would not the Maryland court permit a
state's witness to testify as to comparisons made by compelling the defendant
outside of court to try on a hat, an affirmative act on the part of the defendant
tending to incriminate? The Shanks 51 case seems to requir an affirmative
answer. If so, is not the reasoning of the Allen 52 case fallacious, for it should
be immaterial to the defendant whether incriminating evidence is compelled
inside or outside of court, since whether it falls from the lips of a witness or
is visually seen by the jury, it is nevertheless incriminating,
SPEAKING FOR IDENTIFICATION

Sometimes it might be material to require the accused to speak words so
that a witness can identify his voice as being that of the criminal. Then the
question is presented, are words thus spoken "testimonial utterances" and
therefore within the immunity of the privilege? If the test be that the words
spoken contain incriminating information, then this is not a case of "testimonial utterance," for the incrimination is derived from the quality of the
oice, not the substance of the words. The probability that a threat of force
or other inducement will affect the quality of the voice, and consequently the
probative value of the evidence is remote as compared to a true confession, for
actually, the accused has little power of control over the sound of his voice.
While he can create ideas, normally he cannot create a new voice.
A Texas case 53 has held otherwise, namely, that an accused cannot be
required to appear before a witness and to repeat certain words for purposes
of identification. But the court, following Apodaca v. State,54 based its decision on the ground that the privilege protects an accused from being forced
to produce by his own independent act the incriminating evidence in contradistinction to the production of the evidence by the act of witnesses or officers.5 5 Since the defendant, and not third persons, produces the evidence
when he speaks, it is privileged. Therefore the court has not actually 'considered the core of the problem-is this a testimonial utterance?5 6
50. 45 A. 2d 85 (Md. 1945).

51. Supra note 50.
52. Supra note 49.
53. Beachem v. State, 144 Tex. Cr. R. 272, 162 S. W. 2d 706 (1942).
54. 140 Tex. Cr. R. 593, 146 S. W. 2d 381 (1940) (The defendant could not be comy~elled to perform certain acts to determine whether he was intoxicated).
55. For example, see Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 245 (1879) (Comparison of foot;prints permitted); or IvicGarry v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. R. 597, 200 S. W. 527 (1918)
(Accussed could 'be fingerprinted against his will).
56. Compare Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa. 369, 373, 395, 9 Atl. 78, 81 (1887).
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INTOXICATION

The cases in which the accused has been compelled to submit his body
to an examination for the purpose of ascertaining intoxication are invaluable
to the study of the privilege's scope because they illustrate, first, the most
recent interpretations and the scope of the privilege, and second,. a fear on
the part of all courts and particularly by those courts limiting the scope of
the privilege to testimonial compulsion, of an undue invasion of an individual's
body by physical contact on the part of officers. In other words, the underlying consideration is the old adage, "give them an inch and they'll take a
mile."
. Suppose for example, the defendant is arrested for driving a car while
under the influence of intoxicants and that while he is in jail, an officer or
physician observes his actions and general demeanor. Can the officer or physiclan testify at the trial as to the results of the observations? No court will
hold in this situation that the defendant was furnishing evidence against
57
himself, even if the defendant objected to the observations.
Again, suppose that the officer or police surgeon instead of merely observing, requires the same defendant to take a drunko-meter test, e.g. walk
a straight line, put his hand to his nose, sign his name, make sudden turns,
answer questions. Would the evidence from these tests violate the privilege?
In Green Lake County v. Dones,5s where such a factual situation was
presented, the court said "no" on the broad ground that the privilege did not
extend to the exclusion of the accused's body but was limited to physical compulsion for the purpose of extorting testimonial evidence from him. 59
In holding that drunko-meter tests did violate the privilege, the court
in Apodaca v. State 60 declared, "Demonstration by an act which tends to,
self-incrimination is as obnoxious to the immunity guaranteed by the Constitution as one by words." 61 Thus the same basic conflict regarding the scope
There the distiict attorney called upon defendant to stand and repeat certain words so a
witness could identify his voice, which he did without objection. Though court held waiver
on facts, it said, "If it should be sanctioned, what would prevent a person 'accused of
having stolen property in his possession from successfully interposing a like plea of constitutional immunity, and thus thwarting any attempt to search for and recover the property? While the constitutional rights of those accused should never be violated, care must
be taken not to deprive the commonwealth of any legitimate means of detecting anct
punishing crime."
57. Millican v. State, 143 Tex. Cr. R. 115, 157 S. W. 2d 357 (1941); People v.
Dennis, 132 Misc. 410, 230 N. Y. Supp. 510 (1928).
58. 247 Wis. 90, 18 N. W. 2d 348 (1945).
59. The compulsion consisted of loading defendant into an officer's car and taking him
to the physician's office over his objection. The court intimated that if the information in
either the answers to questions propounded or in the writing on the paper should incriminate the defendant, the evidence is inadmissible as a testimonial utterance. See Noe v.
Monmouth County Common Pleas Court, 6 N. J. Misc. 1016, 143 Atl. 750, 752 (Sup. Ct.
1928).
60. 140 Tex. Cr. R. 593, 146 S. W. 2d 381 (1940).
61. 51 Id. at 382. Accord, People v. Dennis, 131 Misc. 62, 226 N. Y. Supp. 689 (SupCt. 1928) ; Booker v. Cincinnati, 5 Ohio Ops. 433, 1 Ohio Supp. 152 (1936).
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of the privilege is apparent in these two cases-the old delineation between
words and acts. But for an example of the confusion which is evidenced
within one jurisdiction compare People v. Dennis6 2 with Schmidt v. District
Attorney.03 In the Dennis case the court stated that compulsory examination
of the accused to determine his condition violated the privilege, since compulsory finger printing before conviction is against the privilege in New York,
while the Schmidt case implied that such a compulsory examination would
not violate the privilege.
Now suppose, over defendant's objection, that a police surgeon extracts
body fluid-blood or urine-from him. Will the evidence so obtained be
67
6
admissible if material? 64 The Apodaca 65 and Booker 6 cases, among others,
are again authorities holding such evidence to be inadmissible as against the
privilege.
A strict analogy cannot be drawn between requiring a defendant to take
a drunko-meter test and a'blood test, foi" in the latter case the mere fact that
a hypodermic needle is injected into the-accused's body subjects him to certain possible dangers such as an infection. The forced extraction of blood
from the body as distinguished from mere observation by officers or acts on
the part of the accused brings the problem closer to that region which the
.cburts, whether they follow the liberal or restrictive construction of the privilege's scope, hesitate to sanction. Here is one of those extreme factual situations which some courts deem so repugnant to the coicept of individual
freedom that they refuse to stop with the rule against self-incrimination. Perhaps the root of the trouble is that the courts are confusing the rule of inlawful searches and seizures with the rule against self-incrimination. The

question which they ask is "where in principle can we stop if we hold that the
rule against self-incrimination will not exclude such evidence?" The distinc-

tion between these and other factual situations discussed which is so repugnant to the courts seems to be that the extraction of a substance from the
body against the will of the accused necessarily involves an assault and battery. "The hypodermic needle was not inserted into the body of the defendant
for the purpose of treatment. The doctor, upon request of the police officer,
extracted the blood to be used in bringing about the conviction of the defendant. It was plainly an illegal act constituting an assault and battery upon the
62. 131 Misc. 62, 226 N. Y. Supp. 689 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
63. 8 N. Y. S. 2d 787 (1939).
64. For a discussion of the probative value of such tests, see Ladd and Gibson, The

Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Deterinize Intoxication, 24

IOWA

L. Rxv.

191 (1939).
65. Supra note 60.
66. Supra note 61.
67. Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N. J.Misc. 633, 16 A. 2d 80 (1940); see Novak v.
District of Columbia, 49 A. 2d 88 (D.C. 1946).
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person of the defendant .... ,, 68 But does Mot the taking of a shoe or forcirig the accused to put on a coat or hat necessarily constitute an assault?
There has been no case in which the court has squarely faced the problem and held that blood taken forcibly from the accused to determine intoxication is admissible, although a few courts have indicated that they would
69
permit such evidence to be introduced, whether compulsory or voluntary.
0
Granting that there is no case directly in point, one court,7 in permitting a witness to'testify that the accused refused to submit to a blood or urine
test to determine the alcoholic content, used language to the effect that the
privilege extends only to extractions from the person's own lips and disclosures by utterances. Other courts have adopted a similar attitude.71 In
State v. Cramt72 a physician was permitted to testify as to the results of a
blood test which the court said was made under compulsion. After an automobile accident in which the defendant was rendered unconscious, he was
arrested and taken into custody by the police. While he was still unconscious,
at the request of tin officer, the -physician treating him extracted a sample of
blood to determine its alcoholic content. At the trial a witness.was permitted
to testify as to the result of the blood analysis. The majority of the Supreme
Court of Oregon held that the testimony did not violate the privilege against
self-incriribination although they refrained from expressing an opinion as to
whether an accused could be forced by the court to undergo a physical examination or to submit to a blood test. Apparently, after an exhaustive consideratiori of the cases, the court reached this conclusion by confining the privilege
to testimonial utterances. It assigned as an additional reason the fact that the
accused was not required to do an affirmative act pointing out in citing State
68. State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d 283, 292 (1945), dissenting opinion of
Chief Justice Belt. Also note the court's observation in Bednarik v. Bednarik, supra note
57 at 90, "To subject a person against his will to a blood test is an assault and battery,
and clearly an invasion of his personal privacy."; New York Laws of 1921 c. 726, 1941
Ops. Atty. Gen. (N. Y. Pg. 143). The Attorney General of New York, in advising the
state police regarding the provision for the adxnission of blood, urine or saliva tests in
intoxication cases, stated, "It is highly questionable whether any such implied authority
(to use force) may be read into it involving as it must what may constitute a bodily
assault to extract urine, saliva or blood from an unwilling person. The safeguarding of
the body of a defendant from harm or attack is an important element in the administration
of criminal law."
69. State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. 2d 435 (1937) ; State v. Cash, 219 N. C. 818,
15 S. E. 2d 277, 278, 279 (1942). In the latter case, the court held ihe procurement of the
specimen to be voluntary, but declared, "It is the rule in this jurisdiction that physical
facts discovered by witnesses on information furnished by the defendant may be given in
evidence, even where knowledge of such facts is obtained ... by intimidation, duress, etc."
70. State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N. E. 2d 265 (1938). But cf. Booker v.
Cincinnati, supra note 51.
71. State v. Nutt, 78 Ohio App. 336, 65 N. E. 2d 675 (1946); State v. Benson, 230
Iowa 1168, 300 N. W. 275 (1941). In both these jurisdictions the prosecutor is permitted
to comment upon the accused's refusal to testify. However statutes in at least two states,
providing for the-admission of such tests as evidence, state that the accused's refusal to
permit the test shall not be admitted against him. Ore. Laws 1941 c. 430 § 1; 8 ORE.
Con'. LAws AxN. §§ 115-318a (Supp. 1943) ; Mr. REv. STAT. c. 19 § 121 (1944).
72. 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d 283 (1945).
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v. Griffin '3the distinction between evidence which is the result of a prisoner's
affirmative act and evidence obtained without his active participation but
74
against his will. Mr. Justice Brand, in a separate concurring opinion, asserted that the basic problem does not involve the privilege against self-incrimination but rather the rule against the admissibility of illegally obtained
evidence. Therefore, if the court finds that the taking of the blood is unlawful and not incident to a lawful arrest, the question whether such evidence
is admissible or inadmissible is dependent upon that court's attitude toward
illegally obtained evidence. In his opinion the taking of the blood was an unlawful trespass which rendered both the officer and physician liable criminally
and civilly. "Many acts of officers in searching the body of an arrested person
-establish a prima facie case of assault and battery, but are not unlawful be,cause justified by public policy under the police power ... The common law
which justifies the search of an arrested person and the removal of articles of
Iiis clothing has not established any justification for the taking of his blood." "'
Another point which was not raised or considered by the court in the
Cralit case was whether the physician violated a duty flowing from the
physician-patient relationship when he extracted the blood and gave it to the
officer.
Where a coroner without a warrant of any kind and without the consent.
of the patient, took blood from the unconscious patient while he was in the
operating room, and a blood test was sought to be introduced against him in
a prosecution for driving while intoxicated, the court held, in State v. WelthaU
that it was error to receive in evidence the blood sample and the testimony
of experts based thereon-though the ground for exclusion was not that it
-violated the -privilege against self-incrimination. "We cannot bring ourselves
to approve such a course; and we find no authority which requires us to do
So." 77

Situations wherein the accused is forced to regurgitate incriminating objects which he has swallowed are closely analogous to the intoxication cases.
In a recent California case, 78 evidence as to the narcotic content in substances
-which had been forcibly pumped from the defendant's stomach was held adanissible in an action for the forfeiture of the defendant's car for illegally
transporting narcotics. "It is our view that the privilege only protects the individual from any forced disclosures made by him, whether oral or written.
73. Supra note 23.
74. 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d 283, 289 (1945).
75. Id. at 291, Chief Justice Belt (Id. at 294) dissented on ground that both the con-

stitutional guarantee against illegal search and seizure and the privilege were violated as
"it is shown by uncontradicted evidence that the defendant, while in the custody of the
law, was compelled by an unlawful act to furnish evidence to be used against himself."
76. 228 Iowa 519, 292 N. W. 148 (1940). The majority in the Cram case distinguished
this case by noting that the defendant was not under arrest.
77. Id. at 149.
18. People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal. App. 2d 199, 168 P 2d 443 (1946).
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It is limitedto the protection against testimonial compulsion... it does not extend to the exclusion of his body as evidence when such evidence may be relevant and material." 79 The court qualified its decision by refusing to express
an opinion, first, as to whether an accused could be ordered by a court to submit to such a physician examination, and secondly, as to whether the method
used by the officers to obtain the evidence was legal, since illegally obtained
evidence is admissible in California.80
The accused, in a Texas case,8 ' was arrested for receiving and concealing
stolen rings. A flouroscopic examination conducted against his vigorous protests revealed that the rings were in his stomach, and again contrary to his
.wishes, he, was forced to eliminate them by the use of an enema. The court
held that the rings were admissible evidence on the ground that the officers
had a legal right to arrest one suspected of committing a felony in their
presence, and to make such a reasonable search as would permit them to ascertain whether or not the accused possessed the stolen property. The *court
reasoned that if an accused can be forced to place his fobt ,in foot-tracks
found at the scene of the crime, the method employed in the present case to ob82
tain the rings was not unreasonable and therefore not illegal.
PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS

The same principles involved in factual situations where substancesblood, urine.or objects-are taken from within the body of the accused and
used against him, underlie those situations where a physical examination is
made of the accused's private parts to determine the presence of a venereal
disease or of a previous pregnancy and the results used against the defendant.
In both cases the body of the accused produces the incriminating evidence,
and in neither case does the probative force of the evidence depend upon the
credibility or testimony of the accused. Since the physical facts speak for
themselves, there is again no need to force the prosecuting officers to search
for other extrinsic evidence to prove the fact. Yet the numerical weight of
authority holds that the privilege against self-incrimination is violated when
an accused is forced to submit his private parts to a physical examination by a
court appointed physician. In an early case, People v. McCoy,8 3 the prisoner,
79. Id. at 451.

80. Accord, U. S. v. Ong .Siu Hong, 36 P. I. 735 (1917). The court held that the
privilege had not been violated when the defendant, accused of an opium offense, was
forced to discharge morphine from his mouth.
81. Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Cr. R. 420, 141 S. W. 2d 341 (1940).
82. Note the anomalous situation which seems to exist in Texas-an accused cannot
be compelled to walk a straight line or otherwise perform an affirmative act which might
tend to prove intoxication, Apadoca v. State, supra note 50, though he may be forced to
give up evidence which is within his body under the right of officers to make a reasonable
search and seizure.
83. 45 How. Pr. 216 (N. Y. 1873). But see the statement of the court in People v.
Sallow, 100 Misc. Rep. 447, 165 N. Y. Supp. 915, 921 (Gen. Sess. N. Y. C. 1873). "The
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under airest for murdering her bastard child, was forcibly examined by order
of the corbner for the purpos6 of determining whether she had recently been
pregnant and delivered of a child. The court excluded the testimony of the
lhysiciaii, asserting, "They might as well have swo'n the prisoner, and cornpeled her, by threats, to testify that she had been pregnant and been delivered
of the child, as to have compelled her, by threats, to allow the'm to look into
her person, with the aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she had been
pregnant and been recently delivered of a child." 84 Similarly, in the leading
statutory rape case,8S, where the defendant had been examined over his objection for a contagious disease and the testimony of the physician admitted
as showing that the defendant might have communicated the disease to the
prosecutrix.by the alleged rape, the court held the privilege had been violated. Two grounds were assigned: first, a person cannot be compelled to
exhibit those portions of his body which are usually covered; and second, such
an exarnination constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure.8 6
I. Even under these fact situations, a few courts recently have applied the
restrictive construction of the privilege.by limiting, in effect, its scope to
"testimonial utterances." And so the testimony of a physician in a statutory
rape case,87 as to the results of an examination compulsory made of the accused's private parts, to ascertain whether he had gonorrhea was admissible.
The Nevada court, following the principles enunciated in State q. Ah Chlucy,88
refused, to extend the privilege to physical disclosures. Again, evidence obttained'from a physical examination compelled under the Selective Service Act
was admissile and not violative of the privilege.89 And the court could order
ruli ng in the case of Pebple v. McCoy ... in so far as it held that the evidence as to the
condition discovered by a compulsory physical examination of the defendant was not
admissible in evidence, must be considered overruled by the authorities cited."
84. 45 11low.'Pr. 216, 217 (N. Y. 1873).
85. State- : Height; 117 Iowa 650,,91 N. W. 935 (1902).
86. In Iowa, -illegally -obtained evidence is inadmissible. Accord, Bethel v. State, 178
Ark. 277, 10 S. W. 2d 370 (1928y. Since the defendant admitted the sexual intercourse and
defended that the prosicutiix hack cmepted, the testimony as to the infection did not tend
to prove the rape, but only tdf,"'pejudice degrade, and humiliate" the defendant before
the ju6. People v. Akin, 25 Cal. App. 373, 143 Pac. 795 (1914) (no reason assigned);
McManus v. Commonwealth, 264 Ky. 240, 94 S. W. 2d 609 (1936) (such evidence is
"illegal and incompetent); State v. Matsinger, 180 S. W. 856 (Mo. 1915); State
v. HF6tohi, 247 Mo. '657, 153 S. W. 1051 (1913); State v. Newcomb, 220 Mo. 54, 119
S. W. 405 (1909-). See People v. Corder, 244 Mich. 274, 221 N. W. 309 (1928) (waiver of
privilege on facts). Compare cases involving the right of health officers under the police
power of the state to coihidl Exanfinations for venereal diseases. Wragg v. Griffin, Sheriff,
185 Iowa: 243, 170 N. W. 400 (1919); Rock v. Carney, 216 Mich. 280, 185 N. W. 798
"
(1921).
87. Skianior6 v. Stafe, 59 Nev. 320, 92 P. 2d 979 (1939). Accord, Martinez v. State,
96 Tex. Cr. R. 138, 256 S. W. 289 (1923) (no reason assigned or cases cited).
88. 14. Nev. 79 (1879) ; see note 40 supra.
89..Biatcher v. 1. S., 149 F. 2d 742 (C. C. A. 4th 1945), eert. denied, 325 U. S. 885
(1945).
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that a female defendant charged with adultery submit to a medical examination to determinh whether she was pregnant.90
A slightly different view has been taken by some courts of physical examinations of an accused's private parts in cases where the defense of insanity has been interposed. Thus, in a case 91 where the defendant, accused
of uxoricide, pleaded sadistic insanity, a court order providing for a physical
examination of the defendant's private parts to adjudge whether he was
sexually abnormal was held proper. "The purpose of making the order was
to enable the court to arrive, if possible, at the truth of the existence o- nonexistence of certain physical facts, which the defendant had introduced into
the case in his defense ....

"

92

MENTAL EXAMINATIONS
The pfoblems attending cases where 'the accused has interposed the de-,
fense of insanity and has been compelled to submit to a mental examination by
alienists differ from those presented by cases involving only physical facts,
for a thorough mental examination necessitates conversation or oral "utterances on the part of the accused. And, unlike compelling an accused to speak
for purposes of identification, the content or information given by the accused's spoken words is one of the bases for ant alienist's opinion. The use of,
compulsion in the form of duress, inducenents, threats of force and the like
might affect the veracity of the information and consequently lessen the probative value of the alienist's opinion, since the accused has control over what
he may say. This is not strictly analogous to a physical examination of the
defendant's body pr the use of things owned by ,him,*for a person cannot
change the marks and scars on his body or the resemblance of his shoe to
footprints. Setting aside the element of waiver; thi§ consideration brings a
mental examination close to being a true testimonial utterance protected by
the privilege against self-incrimination.
But there are also other considerations present which should be given
weight before classifying such utterances as true coiifessions. Starting with
the hypothesis that the object of admitting or excluding certain evidence is to
place the best and most reliable evidence before the jury so that the truth
may be elicited, if in insanity cases only testimony of physicians chosen by the
90. Villaflor v. Summers, 41 P. I. 62 (1920). See Territory v. Chung Nung, 21

Hawaii 214 (1912). Cf. People ex rel. Baker v. Strautz, 386 Ill. 360, 54 N. F. 2d 441
(1944) where the court held constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power an act
authorizing the court to order an examination 6f aniy person coming before it 'charged
with a crime who appeared to be suffering -from a communicable disease and to commit
such a person to an institution if found to have the disease.
91. State v. Petty, 32 Nev. 384, 108 Pac. 934 (1910). But note that Nevada had
already committed itself to the libeial view by holding in State v. Ah Chuey , .nmpra note
40, that an accused could be compelled to display marks and scars on body, usually
covered, in court to the jury for identification.
92. Id. at 937. Accord, State v. Coleman, 96 W. Va. 544,123 .S. E. 580 (1924).
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accused was permitted, because of the factor of self-interest, the evidence
before the jury would have less probative value than if, in addition, the testimony of impartial physicians appointed by the court were also admitted. 9
Another argument advanced is that the privilege was designed to exclude only
evidence which supplies a link in the chain of evidence that the defendant
committed the act the law denounces, and that it has no application to an
inquiry into the defendant's mental responsibility at the time the act was
committed. The defendant himself has raised the issue of insanity and has
invited an'inquiry into his own mental condition. Upon making this claim,
he should not be able to frustrate a complete examination and investigation,
but should be deemed to have waived any rights he had under the privilege
94
clause.

Statutes providing for the appointment by the court of disinterested
physicians to examine or investigate the sanity of the accused have generally
been upheld, particularly when the statute refrains from designating of what
the examination will consist. 95
Most cases in which the accused seeks to exclude the testimbny of state
appointed alienists by demanding an application of the privilege can be disposed of by finding on the facts that the accused voluntarily acceded to the
examination. 96 There is also no difficulty where the opinion of 'the alienist
has been predicated upon observation alone, without recourse to conversa93. In Noelke v. State, 214 Ind. 427, 15 N. E. 2d 950, 954 (1938) the court said,

"Witnesses appointed by the court to examine and observe one who is accused of crime
and who has filed a plea of insanity to the charge affords the court and jury testimony as
free from influence and prejudice as is humanly possible to obtain."
94. Argument of the'counsel for the state in Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N. W.
634, 636 (1930). In State v. Petty, supra note 91, the court also based testimony of a
physician as to results of a mental examination on waiver. The court, in State v. Cochran,
203 S. W. 2d 707 (Mo. 1947) based admissibility of such testimony as to defendant's
sanity on waivbr, distinguishing mental examinations from physical examination in rape
cases, note 86 supra, thereby making it possible in Missouri for an accused to be compelled to submit to an examination when he defends on the ground of insanity, but not
otherwise.
95. Hunt v. State, 248 Ala. 217, 27 So. -d 186 (1946) (Statute constitutional, since
it did not provide for defendant to do an affirmative act) ; Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518,
22 P. 2d 1109 (1933) ; Wymer v. People, 114 Colo. 43, 160 P. 2d 978 (1945) ; Noelke v.
State, 214 Ind. 427, 15 N. E. 2d 950 (1938) (Court stated examination under statute must
be confined to constitutional limitations but it did not define those limitations) ; Commonwealth v. Di Stasio, 294 Mass. 273, 1 X. E. 2d 189 (1936) ; Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184,
231 N. W. 634 (1930) (Statute constitutional, for it was construed as permitting only such
an examination and investigation as would be consistent with the privilege and searches
and seizures clauses). Cf. People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N. W. 2d 18 (1942) where
court held that a statute providing for appointment of psychiatrists to determine whether
an accused is a criminally psychopathic person did not violate privilege because it applies
only to criminal cases and this case is a civil inquest concerning accused's mental condition
and sexual deviations. But cf. People v. Dickerson, 164 Mich. 148, 129 N. W. 199 (1910)
where court held unconstitutional as violating due process a statute providing for appointment by court in a homicide case of experts where any issues involved expert knowledge.
96. People v. Bundy, 168 Cal. 777, 145 Pac. 537 (1914) (absence of counsel did not
affect voluntary character) ; People v. Strong, 114 Cal. App. 522, 300 Pac. 84 (1931) (no
objection by defendant) ; Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547 (1926) (even though
defendant's counsel absent); Commonwealth v. Millen, 289 Mass. 441, 194 N. E. 463
(1935) ; State v. Church, 199 Mo. 605, 98 S. W. 16 (1906) (no objection by defendant) ;
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tion.9 Dicta in several cases assert that an examination for insanity against
the will of the accused does not violate the privilege, though the court does
not state expressly whether an examination including oral utterances on the
part of the accused would be permitted. 98 In a recent Alabama decision, 99
where the court had appointed a commission of experts to examine the defendant for insanity, the experts were permitted to testify as to their opinion
derived from their examination. The examination included an interrogation
of the defendant. Though the court resolved that there was no .evidence of
the use of compulsion, it indicated that the method used in the examination
did not- infringe the privilege clause, for ". . . there was no affirmative act
or declaration of defendant offered against him, but only the expert opinion
reached by the doctors as. the result of their examination." 100
On the other hand, a few cases have directly held that the court cannot
appoint alienists with a view to their testifying as to the sanity of the ac2
an expert was permitted to testify that the defendant
cused.'x0 In one case 10
had refused -his request to submit to an insanity examination, though the
court said at the same time that the defendant could justly complain had he
been forced to undergo the examination.
People v. Furlong, 187 N. Y. 198, 79 N. E. 978 (1907); Wehenkel v. State, 116 Neb.
493, 218 N. W. 137 (1928) (no objection by defendant); Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184,
231 N. W. 634 (1930). See People v. Austin, 199 N. Y. 446, 93 N. E. 57 (1910).
97. State v. Genna, 163 La. 701, 112 So. 655 (1927) ; Commonwealth v. Di Stasio,
294 Mass. 273, 1 N. E. 2d 189, 195 (1936), "The notion that a person accused may not
be subjected to the observation of witnesses and jurors is a perversion of the rule against
self-crimination." People v. Kemmler, 119 N. Y. 580, 24 N. E. 9 (1890); State v.
Eastwood, 73 Vt. 205, 50 Atl. 1077, 1079 (1901), ". . . otherwise one tinder indictment
could insist upon strict seclusion and being unseen." See Noelke v. State, 214 Ind. 427,
15 N. E. 2d 950, 953 (1938).
98. State v. Nelson, 162 Ore. 430, 92 P. 2d 182 (1939) ; State v. Coleman, 96 W. Va.
544, 123 S. E. 580 (1924) (Defendant pleading insanity compelled to submit to a physical
examination consisting of an X-ray of his head). And see Commonwealth v. Millen, 289
Mass. 441, 194 N. E. 463 (1935) (Evidence as to mental examination admissible, since
doctor did not testify concerning any statement or information given by defendant respecting the crime).
99. Hunt v. State, 248 Ala. 217, 27 So. 2d 186 (1946).
100. Id. at 194. Therefore, the court seems to make a distinction between offering
directly testimony of the defendant and the use of such information as a basis for ascertaining another issue, i.e. insanity, on the ground that the former is an affirmative act by the
defendant, the latter is not. But cf. People v. Furlong, 187 N. Y. 198, 79 N. E. 978, 984
(1907) where a stenographer's minutes of questions and answers were permitted to be
read. The dissent said, "The effect upon the jury of reading the stenographer's minutes
in their presence was equivalent to placing the defendant upon the stand and compelling
him to testify against himself." Note that Alabama is one of the states holding that an
accused cannot be compelled to do any physical act which might incriminate. See, for
instance, Williams v. State, supra note 37 (accused cannot be compelled to stand for
identification) ; Davis v. State, sztpra note 28 (accused cannot be compelled to give up
shoes for comparison with footprints).
101. People v. Scott, 326 Ill. 327, 157N. E. 247 (1927). The court did not discuss the
privilege aspect, but based its conclusion on ground that the effect of including the testimony would be to prejudice the jury against the defendant. But cf. People v. Chrisoulas,
367 Ill. 85, 10 N. E. 2d 382 (1937) where court admitted testimony of physician as to
defendant's insanity because he had not been appointed by the court. See Hunt v. State,
248 Ala. 217, 27 So. 2d 186, 194 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
102. Burgunder'v. State, 55 Ariz.'411; 103 P. 2d 256 (1940).
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DECEPTION TESTS

Recent advances in the field of psychiatry have brought about the development of new techniques which can greatly aid the criminal investigator
or prosecutor in discovering the truth and in breaking down the lies of a
guilty suspect without endangering those who are innocent. One of these
techniques calls for the use of hypnotic drugs in order to lower the inhibitions of the subject.
It is clear that to force an accused without his consent to submit to the
use of the drugs for the purpose of obtaining a confession would be to force
him to make a "testimonial utterance." But suppose that an accused who has
entered a plea of insanity is compelled to take such an hypnotic drug and
while in a delirious dream state is examined by alienists. Could the alienist
testify as to his opinion of the accused's insanity founded upon interrogations
made at that time? The use of information so obtained by the alienist is subject to the same comments expounded in connection with all insanity examinations requiring oral utterances, except that in this case, assuming that "truth
serums" are scientifically reliable in removing inhibitions, the words of the
accused should be without his control.
In People v. Esposito,103 two defendants, on trial for murder, under a
statute petitioned the court to make an order permitting the employment of
two psychiatrists to testify ont their behalf at the expense of the county. The
order and appointment were made. During the course of the examination,
metrazol and sodium amytal, two so-called "truth serums," were administered
to remove the defendant's inhibitions because the doctors believed that the
defendants were shamming and malingering insanity. Testimony of a doctor
as to their insanity based upon the reactions of and information obtained
from the defendants while subject to the drugs was held to be admissible.
"Since they desired to present their claims that they were not legally responsible for their acts because of mental defect, they were 'subject to the use of
methods set up objectively by the medical profession for the proper determination of such claims." 104 It is not clear whether the court meant that any defendant pleading insanity, subjected himself to this method of examination,
or whether this method could be used only when the defendant consented to
an examination by court appointed psychiatrists. But the court did hold that
the use of this method could not be challenged by the court since there was
0°
evidence that these drugs were frequently used in psychiatric examinations.
103. People v. Esposito, 287 N. Y, 389, 39 N. E. 2d 925 (1942).
104. Id. at 928. The court specifically refrained from passing on the question of
whether testimony of the psychiatrist was admissible to establish a confession or admission
of guilt uttered by the subject while under the influence of the drug or whether, if offered,
it would violate the immunity from self-incrimination.
105. Contra: State v. Hudson, 289 S. W. 920, 921 (Mo. 1926). Testimony of a doctor
that he had administered a "truth-telling"' serum and that the defendant had denied his
guilt while under its influence was held to be inadmissible, such testimony being "in the
present state of human knowledge, unworthy of serious consideration."

COMMENTS
Another technique \vhich has been developing to aid the criminal investigator in-. ferreting out the truth is the "ie-.detector." Although there is
authority for the view that, without transgressing the privilege, the results of
a lie-detector test should be admissible against a defendant who has been
compelled to take the test, 0 6 the majority of jurisdictions exclude .any, evidence derived from such a test, even if it is favorable to the defendant, and he
has taken the test voluntarily, .on the ground that its scientific reliability has
not yet been proved. 0 7 No jurisdiction has allowed the use of a detector on
the defendant without his consent. 0 8
In.conclusion, it must be observed, that the above division was. used only
for the sake of convenience in' pfesenting the material and that the scope of
the privilege as applied to. the use of compulsion to obtain an incriminating
physical fact cannot be discerned through an analysis of a. single group of
cases. A pattern can be found in'almost any one state which reveals the extent to- which that state will permit the privilege to be exercised. This pattern
varies according to that state's interpretation of the basic and-historical meaning of -the privilege against self-incrimination. It is manifest that in certain
* extreme cases the courts are using the privilege in order to. protect an accused from a bodily invasion, ahd in so doing, they have distorted its logical
and historical purpose.
MARY ELIZABETH MANN
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106. Inban, Self-Indrinhatiou--What Can an Accuesed PersonrbeCon'pelled to Dof
28 J.CGlm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 261, 287 (1937) ; 37 HIv. L. REV. 1138 (1924).

107. Frye v. U. S., 293 Fed. 1013 (D. C. 1923); State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622,
185 P. 2d 147 (1947) ; People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N. W. 2d 503 (1942) ; State v.
*Cole, 354 Mo..181, 188 S.W. 2d 43 (1945) ; Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A.
2d 389 (1941); People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 913' (1938) aff'd, 279
N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d 31 (1938) ; State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933) ;
State v. -Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P. 2d 147 (1947) ; Le Fevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416,
8 N. W. 2d 288 (1943). Contra: People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 348 (1938).
108. People v. Sims, 395 Ill. 69, 69 N. E. 2d 336 (1946). The court -held that is was
reversable error to admit statements by defendant made while lie-detector apparatus was
on her arm, though detector was not working, since a lie-detector may never be used
on a defendant without her consent.

